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AN ARISTOTELIAN TWIST TO FAITH AND REASON 
Gregg Muilenburg 
INTRODUCTION 
Aristotle taught us much of what we assume about intellectual 
methodology. He maintained that any well-designed investigation 
must determine the nature and scope of the subject matter, 
establish its end or purpose, examine the existing wisdom on the 
matter and argue for that which under critical scrutiny remains 
essential to the proper understanding of the phenomenon. This 
brief investigation of church-related higher education will follow 
a similar pattern. In the first section, I will briefly characterize the 
traditional categories for understanding the relationship between 
faith and reason. In the second, I will examine the epistemic 
structure of values and argue that one understanding of faith sees 
it as sharing that structure. In the final section, I will propose a 
new view of the relation of faith to learning in the context of 
church related higher education and draw some initial conclusions 
concerning the nature of that education. 
Since any investigation must proceed with the aid of assumptions, 
and, since the disclosure of such assumptions is essential to 
responsible scholarship and critical assessment, allow me to 
confess the following operational assumptions: First of all, recent 
developments in epistemology have shown it philosophically 
undeniable that all of our knowledge is perspectival in character. 
Knowing and learning take place in contexts and unavoidably 
reflect those contexts. That there is no Archimedean point is now 
as obvious in epistemology as it is in physics. The debt for this 
change in epistemic attitude is owed to the philosophers and 
historians of science who argued persistently and painfully for a 
position that often alienated them from their colleagues and their 
tradition. As a consequence, we are now "invited" to see faith and 
learning as much more intimately related ( owing to the shared 
quality of perspective) than any self-respecting scholar would have 
admitted during the prior two centuries (in the so-called 
foundationalist era, a time when knowledge was thought to have an 
indubitable base). 
That few, if any, persist in the error that is foundationalism does 
not, however, entail that the new perspectivalism is immune to 
error. Very often the truth of the dictum, "AH knowledge is 
perspectival", is confused with its fallacious converse, "All 
perspective is knowledge." A proper investigation of the 
difference would require another forum, but there are at least a few 
earmarks. Perspective is usually unassailable. Knowledge 
is defeasible (falsifiable), and welcomes, even demands, rational 
challenges. Perspective is relative. It is its essence to be such. 
Knowledge, on the other hand, is relative only to its perspective. 
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In all other respects it is absolute. 
A closely related assumption reminds us that knowing, like 
believing, is an activity in which people engage. It is not 
generically human, as the Enlightenment had us believe. Nor is it 
inert and sterile, as modem science had us believe. Knowing is 
acting in pursuit of a goal, and as such, is to be understood in terms 
of the knower's precipitating desires and beliefs. Aristotle was 
right to insist on this interpretation of knowledge as action; but, he 
was wrong to restrict it to merely practical knowing. All knowing 
involves a pattern of action which must be practiced, perfected and 
habituated through a constant commitment to it. Perhaps Plato 
was right in describing learning as more like loving than like 
seemg. 
APPROACHES TO FAITH AND LEARNING 
Over the centuries there have been many different ways of 
understanding the relationship between faith and learning (faith 
and reason). Ignoring for the moment subtle variations and a 
history of muddled terminology, the Christian tradition presents 
four main models: conflict, independence, dialogue and 
integration. 
Conflict, in its early expression, assumed that faith, based on 
divine revelation, is a translational process defying justification 
and hostile to reason. "I believe because it is absurd." (Tertullian) 
In its modem expressions, conflict takes the form of assuming that 
both faith and reason (e.g. religion and natural science) are 
speaking of the same material world and speaking in the same 
positivist language. So scientific materialism and creation science, 
for example, square off assuming that both cannot be 1ight. In the 
one case, natural science has been uncritically extended into 
natural philosophy and, in the other, biblical faith has been 
presented as natural science. Both extensions are confused 
because they assume there is only one project, only one 
perspective, and only one set of tools. This confusion involves 
both a philosophical category mistake and a failure to undertake 
the self-critical henneneutical task. 
Independence is clearly an advance over conflict for it 
acknowledges the integrity of both faith and reason and assumes 
that each has its own inviolate realm of discourse, subject matter 
and language. Faith involves divine revelation which is 
independent of human reason even if not contradicting it (Barth). 
Faith and reason pose no problems left alone to their proper 
spheres. Today this view is expressed in a strict separation of 
religious from scientific thought. One purports to deal with the 
objective material world and the other with the subjective, 
personal one. Science deals with facts and religion deals with 
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values. However this approach is also confused. There is no 
fact/value separation. All facts are theory laden and all theories 
involve value judgments. Knowledge is contextual and 
perspectival. The knower cannot be completely separated from 
that which is known. It is this awareness that leads to the final two 
ways of relating faith and Jearning, both of which presuppose that 
the relationship between faith and learning is a · close and 
complementary one. 
Dialogue assumes that each side has much to learn from the other. 
This becomes especially clear when certain types of fundamental 
questions or methodological parallels are considered. While 
disciplinary integrity must be maintained, there are questions of 
ultimate significance which both sides can approach from their 
respective analyses. Dialogue fosters the sort of interdisciplinary 
cooperation necessary for dealing with the complex issues of our 
emerging global society and the sort of self-critical examination 
necessary for intellectual honesty and humility. Such dialogue 
preserves disciplinary integrity while also accommodating the 
wider human condition in and through which it takes place. 
This understanding of the relationship of faith and learning is 
particularly at home in the Lutheran tradition where faith is 
understood as trust in the justifying power of God's grace brought 
into critical relationship with the other realms of human experience 
and thought. The dialectical pursuit of truth in such a fashion is 
clearly a viable expression of a doxologicalvisioil. 
While dialogue may be the most realistic goal in relating faith and 
learning, it is not the only one reflective of the Reformational 
heritage. There is a fourth option, that of integration. In this 
understanding of the intimate connection of faith to reason, the two 
are seen to function in intrinsic complementarity, each disclosing 
unique dimensions of reality and connecting them through a 
common metaphysical vision. Integrative relationships stimulate 
both faith and reason to reach out through the educative activity to 
a common confession of a universe seen as an integrated whole. 
Such wholeness is said to be the ultimate goal of education. 
There is, however, little agreement on matters of method and 
practice even among those committed to such integrated education. 
As there is little to be gained, beyond endurance, by plowing 
through these well-tilled church/college taxonomies, and as these 
schemes appear to place the plow before the horse by restricting 
education before understanding it, our time might be better spent 
in speculating directly on the character of integrative education we 
seek. 
THE STRUCTURE OF VALUE AND FArnI 
There is nothing philosophically perspicuous about saying one 
values something. The term 'value' is as vacuous as it is 
ubiquitous. Upon reflection, however, it is clear that values· are 
beliefs, albeit beliefs of a special sort. It seems to me that values 
are assessment beliefs. That is to say, they are beliefs assessing 
one "thing" to be better than another, and thus have the general 
form: 'x is better than y.' Of course values never display just this 
form, for values are never devoid of content and rarely absolute. 
Virtually anything can be the object of a value. People, events, 
physical objects, situations, ideas; all are objects of assessment 
beliefs. Consequently, any assessment will have to be relative to 
the nature of the thing being assessed and the purpose to which 
that thing is put. For example, one does not actually say that one 
values cats. Rather one says that cats are to be valued over dogs, 
or cats are better than parrots; or more properly, that cats are nicer 
pets than dogs or parrots. So also, values will be relative to the 
individual holding the belief. We may differ with regard to cats, 
or disagree about what makes a good pet. But all of this is well 
understood, so well understood that we rarely consider values to 
have a structure at all and presume all matters of valuing 
completely relative and beyond rational debate. 
If the basic structure of a value (x is better than y with respect to 
some purpose for some person) is somewhat pedantic, the 
characteristics associated with values are anything but. Most of 
the world's great tragedies are constructed around the lives of 
individuals struggling with values. From Oedipus to Lady 
Macbeth to Willy Loman, the drama recurs. There are simple 
reasons for this to be found in the character of valuing. I will 
mention only two. Values are beliefs that people hold most dear 
to them. They are the beliefs we will least often give up; for they 
are the source of our identity, our community and are reflective of 
our sense of purpose. 
Values are also protected from examination by elaborate 
psychological mechanisms designed to fool others, but as often, to 
fool ourselves. Yet, despite all the secrecy and subterfuge, the 
nature of our values is painfully obvious through our actions. 
Values are the guides for the living of our lives. They are the 
objects of our pursuits. There can be no such thing as a latent or 
inactive value. If something is valued, it is pursued. If it is not 
pursued, it is not valued in those circumstances or valued less than 
something else. Thus, our actions are inerrant records of our 
values. They, like the oracles of old, are not always easily 
interpreted, but they will never lie. Herein lies life's drama: What 
should we value? How do we responsibly pursue it? Why do we 
not pursue that which we believe we value? In short, the ultimate 
question of both life and learning is: How then should we live? 
It seems to me that the answer to this question is itself the 
statement of a value and therein lies the connection of value to 
faith. We ought, of course, to live our lives responsibly and with 
integrity. All other values and the pursuits they occasion ought to 
be subservient to this higher value. But why value responsibility 
and integrity in one's life? There appears to be no further value to 
which one can appeal in answer. There appears no value 
demonstrably higher, no principle from which it can be deduced. 
This is no mere philosopher's dilemma, no idle logician's puzzle. 
There can be no more fundamental demand. But how can we 
answer it? By faith. By our faith we might answer that a life of 
responsibility and integrity is required of us as a response to God's 
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self-revelatory acts of creation and redemption. We have no 
higher value to justify that belief. It has no goal beyond itself, it is 
the paramount value. 
It may seem unconventional, even odd, to speak of faith as a value. 
Faith is a relation between a believer and the object of that 
believing. The oddness attending the term 'faith' so used, is, I 
suspect, very much the same as that which attended the use of the 
term 'value' initially. Valuing, as we have seen is also a relation 
between a person and a thing. One speaks loosely when one calls 
something a value. That looseness is transferred to the claim that 
faith is a value. The only difference is that faith is an ultimate 
value. In all but this respect, it shares the structure of lesser 
values. 
If what has been suggested here is correct, in other words, if faith 
is to be understood as ultimate value; then two implications follow 
for the investigation of faith and learning. Each is rooted in our 
prior assumptions and each will be treated briefly in the 
subsequent section. First of all, learning is action, and action, as 
Aristotle taught us is caused by desire. Knowledge and belief 
condition our actions making them feasible or useful. And the 
emotions help us to find the courage to act. But only desire causes 
us to act. We are motivated to act by our desire for the objects of 
our values. Thus, it would seem to follow that learning cannot be 
fully understood without first understanding the process of desire 
that moves it. Moreover, if faith constitutes an ultimate value, our 
ultimate object of desire, then faith must be intimately, perhaps 
causally, related to knowledge. But these are not new contentions. 
They have always been part of the claims of the church, though not 
couched in Aristotelian terms. 
Secondly, the perspectival character of knowledge leads one to 
expect that faith will be the focal point of a believer's perspective. 
There would seem to be no reason why one's faith would function 
peripherally if it constitutes one's ultimate value. One need not be 
apologetic about the situation. Perspectives are to be expected. 
Perspectives are like interchangeable camera lenses. Each is 
designed to focus our attention on some aspects of the scene by 
eliminating other foci from our field of view. Telephoto lens 
enable us to make clearer and more precise images of distant 
things by eliminating any panoramic potential in the scene. We do 
not criticize the lens for doing so. That is simply how it works. So 
it is with epistemic perspectives. They are unavo�dable. They are 
desirable. 
AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH TO FAITH AND 
LEARNING 
The ultimate goal of all education should be the production of 
wholeness in the lives of human beings. Wholeness involves 
integrity--the integrity that accompanies a life wherein actions 
reflect professed values. Consequently, the nature of education, so 
constructed, is value-directed and action-directed, the nature of 
education, so contrued, is value-directed and action-directed. 
Good education, then will help students to understand their values, 
trace those values to their implications and effectively pursue 
them. Moreover, since the pursuit of goals alone, will not, no 
matter how effective, produce wholeness except that the pursuit is 
a responsible one, good education must be directed toeard the 
responsible pursuit of values. Finally, since the activating force in 
all action is desire, the core of education should be education of the 
desire. 
As desperate as the realms of value and action may seem, they 
have as their common element the unique human faculty of desire. 
Those things we call values are the patterns of desire we use as 
guides for our lives. Moreover, it is only by virtue of the power of 
desire that we act. We may plan our actions with the aid of 
practical reason. We may evaluate them with theoretical wisdom. 
We may encourage ourselves to act with emotion. But we only act 
from desire. Thus our actions are as well judged by our desires as 
our desires are surely evidenced by our actions. This relationship, 
not unlike the oracles of old, never lies but always stands in need 
of interpretation. Therein lies life's drama and education's 
mission. If we ask the timeless question "How then are we to 
live?", we are asking what is worth valuing and pursuing. To 
know the answer to this question is to know how to desire well. 
Education can help us to learn to live responsibly and with 
integrity but it can only do so if we are encouraged, challenged and 
guided to desire aright. If the ultimate goal of education is rightly 
described as wholeness, then its core must be the education of 
desire. 
The nature of education, I would like to suggest, is to be seen as 
perspectival faith directed action. If learning has been properly 
characterized as a human action activated by desire then the core 
of education is the education of desire. If one's faith is the ultimate 
value or object of desire for the Christian ( or for any person of 
faith), then the core of Christian education is the education of 
Christian desire. Such an education involves reflection on the life 
of faith understood as directing one's desire toward the realization 
of one's ultimate values. Such reflection will necessarily 
investigate the proper relationship between these ultimate values 
(including, but not restricted to, our confessional roots) and our 
proximate values (including, but not restricted, to our ethical 
concerns). These relationships are not obvious, but they are 
imperative, if we are to retain our identity in a changing culture. 
All the disciplines in a college must contribute to the education of 
desire. Some will contribute to the store of empirical knowledge 
necessary for effective and responsible action. Others will help us 
see the implications for our faith and life of the actions we 
contemplate. Others still will help us understand our natures, our 
failings and help us accept our limitations graciously. But all will 
be united in the common task of helping students and ourselves 
understand what it is to desire aright and live well. It must be 
emphasized that desire requires freedom and is individual. So also 
is the action resulting from such desire. Thus the enemy of this 
education is indoctrination and regimentation. 
The situation is no different in the case of Christian education. If 
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one's faith is the ultimate value or object of desire, then the core of 
Christian education is the education of Christian desire. Such 
education requires both understanding and commitment, both 
reflection and cultivation. One must reflect on the life of faith and 
virtue for the demands are by no means obvious. How we are to 
live our lives is not made plain by the mere holding of admirable 
values. It demands difficult investigations into the character of that 
which we hold dear. Such reflection will necessarily investigate 
the proper relationship between our ultimate values (including 
those we call our confessional roots) and our proximate values 
(including our present ethical concerns and personal ambitions). 
All the disciplines of the college contribute to this reflective task. 
Some will contribute to the store of empirical knowledge 
necessruy for effective and responsible action. Others will help us 
see the implications for our faith and life of the actions we 
contemplate. Others will challenge us to see the world afresh and 
give us the power to exceed our egocent1ic ambitions. Others still 
will help us understand our natures, our failings, and help us to 
accept our limitations graciously. But all will be united in the 
common task of helping us to understand what it is to desire aright 
and live well. That not for our own sake alone but also in praise 
of the one that made us. 
The education of Christian desire requixes xeflective activity but it 
also requires cultivating activity. If reflection tells us how to 
desire and act, cultivation helps us to desire and act. What we are 
cultivating in this aspect of the education is commitment. This is 
much more difficult and time consuming work. Again, all the 
disciplines will contiibute to this task in their own way. Little is 
know about how this happens, but we have all seen it in the lives 
of students and faculty who possess such commitlnent and are not 
affraid to admit to their stuggle with the life of faith. This situation 
may only be right, for one does not teach commitment. It has to be 
exemplified, nurtuxed and ecouraged in the context of a community 
of those who take it seriously. It is important work even for its 
nebulousness. Reflection without commitment is otiose as surely 
as commitment without relfection is obtuse. 
It is imperative to see that the task of educating students to 
Chxistian desire is a multifarious one. The sort of reflection 
described demands competencies no one sort of individual can 
possess. We need to understand the natural world thxoroughly that 
better we can appreciate the magnitude of God's self-revelatory 
act of creation. So also, we need to understand the human world 
thoroughly that better we can appricieate the magnificence of 
God's redemptive act. No less mutifarious is the task of 
cultivating commitment. We will need those who challenge "easy 
faiths" and shallow commitment; and those who strengthen 
through doubt We will need those who nurse "damaged faith;" 
and those who encourage tlrrough devotion. As there is not one 
path to commitment, so there is no one guide. 
By way of recapitulation and recommendation, it has been 
suggested that we need no longer apologize for the pursuit of 
knowledge in the context of faith. We cannot avoid the 
perspectival character of learning, and the perspective of faith is 
a petfectly legitimate one. It has also been suggested that we can 
begin to understand the perspective of faith seeking understanding 
-- the integration of faith and learning -- if we come to see faith as 
the ultimate object of desire. Correspondingly, since learning and 
living are activities, they are brought about by the interaction of 
desire and belief, it seems correct to see Chxistian education as the 
education of Christian desire. Finally, that this project consists of 
two distinct tasks in tension -- reflection and commitlnent -- is no 
accident. It mirrors the tension of trust and assent comprising 
faith, the tension of desire and belief precipitating action, and the 
tension of faith and learning essential to Chxistian life. When these 
tensions are utilized productively, they provide the climate in 
which education flourishes. 
lfthe trip to this point has been tortured but safe for Lutherans; the 
recommendations it produces are straight-forward, but threatening. 
If wholeness is the goal of education, it does not seem to me that 
the traditional Lutheran understanding of education as dialogical 
is sufficient. As is obvious from the preceding, wholeness comes 
through commitment to integrated desire and action. Dialogue is 
involved in that process but it is no substitute for it. Thus, it is 
paramount for church-related higher education to find and nourish 
scholars who are devoted to the active integration of faith and 
learning. As Plato taught us, the enemy of true learning is 
hypocrisy. The integration model is the only one that safeguards 
it. 
The other enemy oflearning is narrow-minded provincialism. The 
education of desire follows no privileged pattern. It is the province 
of no culture and surely no denomination. In fact the education of 
desire is facilitated by as many and varied a set of examples as 
possible. The examples must, however, be lived exan1ples, since 
desiring aright is a practiced art not a theoretical one. What this 
means for church-related higher education is that we have an 
obligation to make our campuses, and especially our faculties 
more diverse. On the eve of the millennium, we can do no better 
for ourselves and our future, than to genuinely commit ourselves 
to integration and diversity. 
Intersections/Summer 1997 
11 
